Openness and isolation: the comparative trade performance of the former Soviet Central Asian countries by Mazhikeyev, A et al.
1 
 
Openness and isolation: The trade performance of the Former Soviet Central Asian 
countries 
Arman Mazhikeyev 
a
, T. Huw Edwards 
a
, and Marian Rizov 
b 
* 
a 
Loughborough University 
b 
Middlesex University 
 
Previous studies characterize some of the Former Soviet Central Asian countries (CACs) as 
“more open” (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) and others as “more isolated” (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) depending on their trade-over-GDP ratio. Being an open or isolationist economy 
has resulted respectively in more or less suitable environment for business and investment. We 
investigate the drivers of CACs trade performance by measuring contributions of country-
specific properties and networking factors in 185 bilateral CACs trade flows over the period 
1995-2011. We find that, even though all CACs’ trade has increased greatly since 1995, for the 
more open economies (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) trade changes are mainly explained by 
networking (bilateral) factors while for isolationist economies (Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan) changes in trade are mostly explained by country-specific properties. 
 
Keywords: trade performance, gravity models, transition, Central Asia, FSU 
 
 
 
 
* This paper is based on Arman Mazhikeyev’s doctoral thesis, however, the authors’ 
contributions to the paper are equal. 
  
2 
 
Openness and isolation: The trade performance of the former Soviet Central Asian 
countries 
 
1 Introduction 
While much of the literature on post-Soviet transition has focused on the experiences of the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian Federation, the Central Asian countries 
(CACs) have received relatively less attention.
1
 There is no study focusing on the trade 
determinants and performance of CACs, even though it has been recognized that there is a strong 
correlation between success in transition from plan to market and foreign trade performance 
(Kaminski et al., 1996). In addition, the international business (IB) literature has not paid enough 
attention to the developments in Central Asia after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and 
there is no study focusing on the business environment in CACs and their trade performance.
2
  
Much of the existing (economics) literature has tended to treat the CACs as a relatively 
homogenous region. However, after more than two decades of independence, important 
differences are emerging. In terms of trade performance, the trade/GDP ratio over the period 
1995-2011 is much higher for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan (38% on average) than for Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan (26% in average). This ranking also corresponds to that in the 
2013 World Bank “Doing Business” report, which reflects the ease of doing business, tax 
collection, investor protection, access to credit, trading across borders, corruption, economic 
freedom, and competitiveness. Kazakhstan (49
th
 out of 183 countries) is the highest ranking CAC, 
followed by Kyrgyzstan (70), Tajikistan (141), and Uzbekistan (154) while Turkmenistan is not 
ranked at all. This perhaps illustrates the close ties between trade openness and overall politico-
economic reforms. 
The standard transition literature emphasises a combination of initial conditions and the 
reform policies adopted during the transition period (Falcetti et al., 2005 present a good review). 
Both initial conditions and, especially, reform policies vary substantially. Trade performance 
                                                          
1
 Some notable exceptions are Rumer (1995; 2000a; 200b), Pomfret (2000; 2003), Burghart and Sabonis-Helf (2004), 
Starr (2004), Hausmann et al. (2005), Dowling and Wignaraja (2005; 2006), and UNDP (2005) which focus on 
general economic development and political issues.  
2
 The IB literature has a few examples of papers on disintegration and rebuilding of networks between former Soviet 
republics (e.g., Davis et al, 1996), but these papers are now rather old. Pittman (2013) covers Central Asia, but from 
the limited perspective of transport system restructuring. 
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clearly reflects, in part, initial conditions, such as resource abundance, geography, transport 
infrastructure, specialization, colonial ties, and so on (Elbourgh-Woytek, 2003; Grigoriou, 2007; 
Levy, 2007; Pomfret, 2011; Sinitsina, 2012; Suvankulov and Guc, 2012) as well as national 
business culture (Buck et al., 2000; Dow and Karunaratna, 2006; Wu et al., 2012) or corporate 
governance (Filatochev et al., 2003). These are quite heterogeneous, as we discuss below. 
However, there is also a strong contrast in terms of reforms enacted since the mid-1990s, as 
measured by the EBRD transition indicators (Stark and Ahren, 2012). It is not easy to 
disentangle the effects of varied initial conditions from those of ongoing reforms, and this is 
made even harder by a changing global and regional environment which impacts the different 
players to varied degrees (Levy, 2007). 
In the paper, we develop an IB-inspired theoretical framework to motivate hypotheses 
and investigate which factors are more important for each individual CAC by measuring the 
proportional share of country-specific properties and networking factors in bilateral trade flows. 
We do this by utilizing the gravity concept (e.g., Head et al., 2010; Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 
2010), which explains bilateral trade in terms of country “masses” (country properties) and 
“distances” (networking). From the previous literature in the field, we would anticipate that these 
countries are all relatively isolated from the rest of the World. However, Pomfret (2006) has 
indicated that some of these countries have started engaging in serious reforms, while others are 
much slower – we will be seeking evidence in support of this. We therefore expect that these 
countries are more heterogeneous than the previous literature has recognised. In addition to 
documenting this heterogeneity, we would identify factors impacting trade, and link policy 
reform to trade performance and business development. 
In terms of the detailed econometric work, by taking a ratio of the ratios of bilateral trade, 
we can separate country-specific from networking (bilateral) factors. Our analysis of 185 CACs 
bilateral trade observations, based on a 37 country panel covering the 1995-2011 period shows 
that: (i) networking factors explain 50% or more of changes in Kazakhstan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s 
trade flows and 5-14% of changes in Turkmenistan’s, Uzbekistan’s and Tajikistan’s trade; (ii) 75% 
of changes in the 185 bilateral CACs’ trade flows are mainly explained by country specific 
properties, i.e., monadic driven trade; (iii) 25% of the 185 bilateral CACs’ trade flows are 
explained by networking (bilateral) factors such as transport costs, combined with 
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landlockedness and RTAs, i.e., dyadic driven trade; (iv) open CACs are more sensitive to global 
and regional shocks compared to isolationist CACs.  
 
2 Context, theory and hypotheses 
2.1 The CACs context 
All the CACs became independent in 1991. Similarities in initial conditions reflect their history, 
geographic closeness and cultures. CACs populations originate from the same Turkic tribes. 
Historically, all were colonized by Tsarist Russia and belonged to the Soviet Union for over 70 
years. All geographically landlocked, CACs differ in terms of neighbours, land sizes and 
landscape, size of population, endowment of natural resources, and historic production 
specialization. Kazakhstan possesses the largest territory, borders with Russia and China and has 
relatively better rail and road connections left from Soviet times. It is well endowed with oil, coal, 
metals and agricultural land. By contrast, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are mountainous, smaller in 
size and population and have mountain borders with China and Afghanistan. Uzbekistan has a 
relatively large population, possesses substantial natural gas reserves and good conditions for 
cotton production. Turkmenistan is much more sparsely populated, but well-endowed with 
natural gas. 
Pomfret (2005) among others concludes that transition reforms proceeded faster in 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan and slower in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. EBRD 
transition indicators show a similar ranking in terms of privatization and price liberalization - 
policies which are an important stage of ongoing transition reforms (Barlow and Radulescu, 
2005; Stark and Ahren, 2012). Although Uzbekistan did well with price liberalization in the mid-
1990s, it kept enterprises under state control and has been slow with other reforms. Gas-rich 
Turkmenistan has been reluctant to make substantial changes in its economy, although after the 
death of the president Nyazov in 2006 the country has begun to liberalize. Tajikistan went 
through a civil war (1992-1997) and since then has been slow to implement reforms. 
The CACs faced huge trade and production hardships with the Soviet collapse and 
subsequent hyperinflation in 1991-1996. Within a year of independence trade with Russia fell 
tenfold (Sinitsina, 2012). Later, in 1998-1999, the CACs were hit by the Russian financial crisis. 
Despite these circumstances, countries were already beginning to diverge in terms of 
international integration – particularly, though not exclusively with Russia. Already by 1998 
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Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan had joined several major RTAs with Russia, including 
the CISFTA in 1994, EurAsEc and SCO in 1996 while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were only 
observers (see Appendix, Box 1). The CACs’ trade with Russia was damaged substantially by 
the 1998 crisis, especially those countries which had engaged in integration (Westin, 1999). The 
more isolationist Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan had less exposure. The period 2000-2007 was 
more fruitful as world prices for the CACs’ primary export goods (oil, gas, cotton) accelerated 
and volumes of trade and FDI inflows, mainly from China and Europe, increased. The main 
beneficiaries were the more open economies, but Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also benefited 
from a global boom and increasing global gas demand, negotiating with China and Iran to reduce 
their dependence on the Russian market. The 2008 crisis had both direct and indirect effects on 
the CACs’ trade and economic wellbeing. The exposure of Kazakhstan’s banks to the global 
financial crisis spread to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan which had 
more limited financial links with the other CACs, Russia and rest of the world where originally 
less affected by the crisis. 
 
2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
A game tree of openness and trade: actors and interactions 
The degree of openness or isolation of an economy can be seen as the outcome of the interaction 
of decisions of a number of actors in response to their environment and to each other. The 
principle actors in any economy constitute consumers/voters, government, MNEs and local firms: 
however, we should also note that the specific post–Soviet environment tends to include 
important roles for ethnic (particularly Russian) minorities and for the politically-connected 
oligarchs who rose during and just after the fall of Communism. Broadly speaking, Figure 1 
shows a game tree outlining the interactions of these actors.  
- Figure 1 here - 
Trade policy is set by the governments, and may take the form of multilateral 
liberalisation or regional integration (the latter being increasingly favoured by the intended 
development of the Eurasian Union). Governments also set the regulatory environment 
governing trade and FDI, and have influence on the legal environment, as well as influencing the 
quality of transport linkages and border efficiency. The presence of multinational agreements 
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and RTAs shows that governments interact with one another: particularly their neighbours (and 
the rest of the world).  
At the same time, however, the trade performance of an economy depends upon the 
decisions of other actors (at micro level), notably firms. If the larger local firms and MNEs 
respond to liberalisation by expanding trade greatly, then the country will see an increase in 
competition and specialisation gains from trade, in turn benefiting consumers. The more elastic 
is firms’ response, the less will be the ‘beggar-my-neighbour’ incentive of a country to protect its 
economy for terms-of-trade reasons (Edwards, 2010). Firms’ responses will, of course, reflect 
remoteness and transport networks, as well as ‘psychic’ distance as demonstrated by Dow and 
Karunaratna (2006). Limao and Venables (2001) find that trade performance is affected by high 
overland transport costs of goods. Historic business networks (Rauch and Trindade,. 2002) and 
their collapse and re-emergence (Davis et al., 1996) and colonial ties (Head et al., 2010)
3
 also 
play an important role. To the extent that MNEs drive the trade response, their liability of 
foreignness (Zaheer, 1995, 2002) can be an important factor as well. However, Yildiz and Fey 
(2012) argue that in transition (and emerging) countries the liability of foreignness is relatively 
less important due to ability of NMEs to bypass local suppliers, customers’ favourable 
stereotypes and curb of appeal brought by the MNEs, and possibly host governments’ desire for 
FDI and foreign technology (e.g., Bevan et al., 2004).  
Depending upon the response of firms, there will be gains in income (perhaps with 
offsetting losses in security) to voters (in Figure 1, defined as theta which will increase). 
However, in countries of limited democracy with powerful oligarchs, the lobbying power of the 
latter is also crucial: if oligarchs’ power is based in exporting industries (such as through the 
control of natural resources), they may favour trade expansion, while if they control import-
competing industries they will resist growth in trade or FDI (in Figure 1, (1-theta) will increase).  
In line with standard political economy bargaining theory, we can see the decision-
making by government as reflecting the relative bargaining weights of voters and oligarchs, 
which will be dependent on the political and institutional makeup of the country. 
 
The actors in the CACs 
                                                          
3
Acharya et al. (2011) assert the impact of colonial ties between former Soviet countries on current trade patterns.   
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Governments: A recent IMF Survey (IMF, 2012) finds a strong correlation between political 
regime and trade policies of the CACs. While all countries have relatively authoritarian regimes, 
there are still considerable differences in political systems. Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan are 
somewhat more liberal compared to Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Kaser (1998) and 
Luong and Weinthal (2002) link CACs’ economic performance to variation in political regimes, 
as Kazakhstan is characterized as “populist with soft autocracy”, Kyrgyzstan as “dualist with 
electoral democracy”, and Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan as “centralist with hard 
autocracy”. Reflecting this, economic liberalisation of each CAC is at different stages. There are 
many other related country-specific features (majority and minority population make up, 
liberalisation level, FDI level and so on) that affect CACs trade performance. Some CACs 
(Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) have a higher level of government intervention and 
state control in their economies compared to others (Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan) where the 
economy is more liberal and relatively more influenced by regional or global economic 
conditions.   
Firms: According to Pomfret (2010), Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, relative 
to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are among the slowest of the transition economies to reform, 
with firms facing less competition and softer budget constraints compared to Russia, let alone the 
EU Accession states. Nevertheless, the CACs, like other transition countries, have experienced 
radical transformations in their political and business landscapes due to the wave of deregulation 
and liberalization of their economies after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (Hoskisson et al., 
2000; Filatotchev et al., 2003). These dramatic economic and political changes affecting CACs 
firms can be seen as regulatory punctuations leading to radical environmental change (Haveman 
et al., 2001; Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008). Firms’ strategic responses to radical environmental 
change are an important factor for the aggregate trade performance of CACs.  
To better understand firm responses to regulatory punctuations in the CACs, we find 
useful insights in the IB literature on liability of foreignness, and particularly the extension to 
this concept by Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) who introduced the parallel concept of “liability of 
localness”. Eden and Miller’s (2004) definition of liability of foreignness focuses on the socio-
political and relational hazards associated with “being a stranger in a strange land”. Similar to 
liability of foreignness facing potential MNE incomers (e.g., Zaheer and Mosakowski, 1997; 
Eden and Miller, 2004), the ongoing transition reforms are producing a degree of ‘liability of 
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localness’ (Perez-Batres and Eden, 2008), with local firms less familiar with operating in a 
globalised and marketised environment. Thus, liability of localness is about the added costs 
faced by local firms, adjusting to “now” being different from “then”; the competitive landscape 
facing the firms has shifted markedly, necessitating new strategies for survival. Local firms need 
to learn the ‘rules of the game’ under liberalisation (Dunning, 2003; Miller and Pisani, 2007).  
Perez-Batres and Eden (2008) demonstrate that emerging market firms with international 
experience in developed countries can better interpret their home market evolving institutions 
which in turn lessens the emerging market firms’ liability of localness. In a related analysis 
D'Aveni and Macmillan (1990) show that under strenuous situations, such as regulatory 
punctuations, firms focusing their attention on the external environment outperformed those 
focusing their attention on the internal aspects of the business. Their argument rests on the notion 
that most internal aspects of the business are not necessarily aligned with the new business 
landscape and need to change. Alternatively, firms that focus on the internal aspects of their 
business, during strenuous situations, may be operating under the assumptions of past cognitive, 
normative, or regulatory structures. Given the prevailing privatization methods in CACs such as 
buyouts by local managers and “give-away” deals (Filatotchev et al., 2003) many firms with 
incumbent managers have focused their attention on the internal aspects of the business thus 
facing high liability of localness.  
Furthermore, under uncertain political and economic conditions such as after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, many CACs firms would have not necessarily understood their 
new institutional environment and this misconception (Scott, 1997) has hindered their ability to 
function. According to March (1988), the greater the uncertainty, the more likely organizations 
are to engage in exchange relations with those with whom they have transacted in the past and 
with those of similar status. Thus, in the CACs, given that many firms were trading or had closer 
organisational links with firms from other Soviet Union countries, especially Russia, it is likely 
that trade patterns after political independence and market liberalisation will remain strongly 
associated with the former Soviet Union countries, and in particular Russia. Such an assertion is 
also in line with Dow and Karunaratna’s (2006) concept of ‘psychic’ distance stimuli.  
In summary, the implication for our theoretical framework is that the liability of localness 
produces a position where oligarchs and state-actors in industries opening to foreign competition 
may lose. In turn, the weakness of local firms – the liability of localness - increases the profit-
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shifting motives for protectionism (Bagwell and Staiger, 2012), and also increases the risks of 
protectionist lobbying by oligarchs. 
Voters and the role of minorities: Although Russian-speaking minorities have shrunk 
considerably since 1989, estimates from 2007 suggest that there were still 4 million ethnic 
Russians in Kazakhstan (25% of the population) and 500,000 (or about 10% of the population) in 
Kyrgyzstan. By contrast, the formerly sizeable Russian populations in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Turkmenistan have shrunk to less than 3% of the population (Peyrouse, 2008). Given that the role 
of language ties is often emphasised as a driver of trade (Dow and Karunaratna, 2006), it is likely 
that Russian minorities will stimulate policy towards openness – at least in the form of RTAs 
with Russia (and Belarus). This is magnified by the increasing foreign policy assertiveness of 
Russia vis a vis ethnic Russians beyond its borders.
4
 Ethnic composition and pressure from 
Russia may both explain why Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are more open – yet more biased 
towards Russia – in trade than other CACs.   
The environment and specificities of CACs: The CACs are large in area, though sparsely 
populated, and are all landlocked. This reduces trade potential, compared to countries with sea 
ports. Raballand (2003) emphasizes the variation in the effect of landlockedness in each CAC. 
Adding to this are issues of transport infrastructure and logistics services in the CACs (Grigoriou, 
2007). Reduced trade potential also reduces the potential benefits to a country from trade 
liberalisation. Again, Kazakhstan, which has industrialised border areas closer to the Russian 
Urals, may have more trade potential than countries further to the South. 
Resource endowment has an important influence on trade performance. Auty (2001), 
World Bank (2002), Pomfret (2004), Felipe et al. (2012) all point out that there is a strong 
correlation between the resource abundance and trade performance of the CACs. Turkmenistan 
and Kazakhstan can be viewed as much richer in resources than the other CACs; while this has a 
clear effect on trade outcome (the recovery in resource prices from 2000 boosted these 
economies), the effect upon policy is harder to determine, since Kazakhstan is relatively open 
and Turkmenistan isolationist. 
Historical environment also affects current performance by government and firms. The 
role of inter-firm networking is explored in Davis et al. (1996) for the case of decline and re-
emergence of Soviet era ties in Estonia – but similar networking factors apply to Central Asia. 
                                                          
4
 http://www.eurasiareview.com/06082014-post-crimea-central-asian-fear-putins-stick-analysis/ 
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Historically poor governance may make effective trade reforms difficult. Tai and Lee (2009) 
emphasise bureaucratic barriers to trade: investors spend 20% (in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) 
and 48% (in Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) of their time to deal with unnecessary 
bureaucracy. Using the 2010 World Bank Governance Indicators (WGI), Magilevski (2012) 
points out the heterogeneity of governance efficiency; out of 230 countries, Kazakhstan ranks 
138, Kyrgyzstan 171, Tajikistan 187, Uzbekistan 199, and Turkmenistan 201. The importance of 
governance environment for trade is also emphasized by Wu et al. (2012). 
 
Hypotheses: expectations and feedback in the openness game 
Non-government actors will affect government policy via three routes. The first is through direct 
feedback: the various players will support or oppose reform depending upon their perceived self-
interest: their influence will depend upon the political reality and bargaining power. The second 
is through expectations (affected by uncertainty), as in any forward-looking game expected gains 
will determine the nature and degree of lobbying. The third is the interaction of different lobbies 
across countries, given that the benefits of trade liberalisation are usually greater when the 
countries act concertedly. 
The history of post-Communist transition countries’ reform process is also important in 
determining whether a country is likely to engage in further liberalisation. Based on EBRD data, 
Barlow and Radulescu (2005) find, for example, that reform is more likely to continue and 
spread to other areas in economies where there is early privatisation of small business. This may 
well feed back through differences in the lobbying balance within the economies.  
Trade outcomes (the relative size and changes in trade for each CAC) can be seen in 
Table 1. Crucially, observed trade in all CACs has recovered sharply in the period since 1998. 
The common factor is that incomes in the Central Asian region grew sharply, spurred by growing 
demand from its main export market (Russia) and, in resource-rich countries, by rising mineral 
prices. While Kyrgyzstan may have seen lower export growth than, say, Turkmenistan, this 
difference can be explained by the fact that the latter is a major gas exporter, at a time when 
fossil fuel demand was buoyant, while the former is resource-poor.  
- Table 1 here - 
Clearly, observed changes in trade volumes reflect the complex interactions represented 
in the openness game tree: the key role of gravity analysis that follows is in decomposing and 
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quantitatively explaining the outcomes depicted in Table 1. Following on the discussion in our 
theory section and to help interpret in a structured way our gravity analysis results we formulate 
four empirical hypotheses: 
 H1: The observed recovery in trade volume (outcome measures of global integration) is 
not necessarily driven by falling trade costs (policy measure), but partially reflects other 
country specific or environmental factors. 
 H2: Networking (bilateral) factors have strongly boosted trade in the more open CACs, 
whereas the more isolationist countries’ trade has grown in spite of, rather than because 
of, trade policy. 
 H3: The countries which have opted for stronger regional integration with other CIS 
states are also more open towards the Rest of the World (RoW) than the isolationist 
CACs. 
 H4: Cyclical fluctuations in the trade of the more open CACs are more closely linked to 
those of the RoW while isolationist CACs’ trade is only weakly affected by cyclical 
fluctuations in the RoW economies. 
If trade reforms can be seen as part of an overall reform process, then we would 
anticipate that the more reforming countries are reducing the liability on foreign firms doing 
business, but the trade-off is that the liability on local firms is increased. However, this may in 
turn spur reforms among local firms, increasing their ability to export. This dynamic process is 
consistent with the more macroeconomic-level predictions in H2. The ability to export more to 
the RoW in H3 again reflects the effects of trade reforms within the CIS, and Kazakhstan and 
Kirgizstan, prompting restructuring of local firms, overcoming their liability for exporting. 
 
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 The gravity concept 
We utilise the gravity model of trade (GMT), a modified form of Newton's gravity equation, this 
predicts bilateral trade flows based on economic sizes and geographic distance of two trading 
countries (Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk, 2010). The GMT has been proven to be consistent with 
empirical findings, and to which have been added theoretical foundations (Anderson and van 
Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand, 1989; Deardorff, 1998; Eaton and Kortum, 2002; Chaney, 2008; 
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Helpman et al., 2008). We start with Anderson and van Wincoop’s (AvW, 2003) theory-based 
GMT which takes the following form:  
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 =
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑦𝑤
(
𝑡𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗
)1−𝜎, (1) 
where 𝑥𝑖𝑗 is nominal exports from country i to country j, 𝑦𝑖 and 𝑦𝑗 are economic sizes of country 
i and j, respectively, 𝑦𝑤  is world economic size, 𝑡𝑖𝑗  is trade cost, 𝑃𝑖  and 𝑃𝑗  are the respective 
price indices, and 𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution.5,6 
World economic size equals the sum of nominal incomes of all countries j, 𝑦𝑤 = ∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗 . 
Theoretically, the economic size of country i (𝑦𝑖) is equal to the gross consumption of goods 
(produced in country i) by country j at a price (𝑝𝑖𝑗) that differs from j’s domestic price level by 
the inclusion of a trade cost (𝑡𝑖𝑗): 
 𝑦𝑖 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑗𝑗 𝑝𝑖𝑗. (2) 
Country j’s economic size (𝑦𝑗) is calculated analogously. It is common practice in a gravity 
analysis to weight the economic size using the nominal GDP of the country. 
The central contribution of AvW (2003) is the concept of multilateral resistance to trade 
(MRT). The outward trade resistance, 𝑃𝑖  and inward trade resistance, 𝑃𝑗  are price indices that 
take into account the weighted aggregate values of observable traded costs across all possible 
export partners of i and import partners of j respectively, and take the form of CES unit cost 
functions: 
 𝑃𝑖 = (∑ 𝑃𝑗
𝜎−1𝜃𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑗 )
1
1−𝜎, 
(3) 
 𝑃𝑗 = (∑ 𝑃𝑖
𝜎−1𝜃𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑗
1−𝜎
𝑖 )
1
1−𝜎. 
(4) 
While MRT terms are not directly observable, gravity studies provide methods to proxy them.
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5
 Note that equation (1) follows AvW (2003) in assuming imports and exports have a proportional effect on bilateral 
trade; however, this assumption can easily be relaxed, as we do later in our estimated equations. 
6
 The elasticity of substitution should be larger than one, 𝜎 >1, but exact values may change as preferences and trade 
opportunities change. The debates over precise level of elasticity of substitution have been ongoing for quit long, 
and it seems there is still no consensus what it should be like. For example, some papers use relatively low 𝜎; for 
example Backus et al. (1994) use 1.5 and Coeurdacier et al. (2007) use 0.6-2. Other papers use relatively high 𝜎; for 
example, Hummels (2001) at around 9 and Romalis (2007) chooses 11. However, since Eaton and Kortum (2002) 
and AvW (2004), many trade papers tend to pick value somewhere between 5-10, although some papers have 
estimated it instead. 
7
 AvW (2003) proposed an iterative procedure to estimate MRT terms based on non-linear least squares but because 
of its complexity it was overshadowed by simpler proxies such as “remoteness” or fixed effect dummies. 
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AvW (2003) assume that trade costs, 𝑡𝑖𝑗 , are symmetric, and of “iceberg” form 
(Samuelson, 1952): 
 𝑡𝑖𝑗 = ∑ (𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚)𝛾𝑚𝑚=1 , (5) 
where 𝑧𝑖𝑗
𝑚  is a function of bilateral trade barriers (transport cost, tariffs, quotas etc.) and the 
parameter 𝛾𝑚. The geographic distance between trading countries i and j can serve as proxy of 
transport cost. 
 
3.2 The gravity decomposition 
The GMT is a simple model with strong predictive power, and has been extensively used for 
empirical studies since its first implementation by Tinbergen (1962). Researchers have 
developed extension and decomposition techniques to allow the GMT to measure overall trade 
costs (AvW, 2004; Jacks et al., 2009; Head et al., 2010) or unobservable MTRs (AvW, 2003; 
Baier and Bergstrand, 2009). 
We make use of a gravity consistent extension of the AvW procedure called the “tetrad” 
method (see Head et al., 2010). This allows us to capture time varying bilateral effects (for 
instance, caused by changes in tariffs or non-tariff measures) on trade volumes by eliminating 
(by division) all importer, exporter, and global (time) effects as well as fixed bilateral effects 
(such as distance or colonial ties). In addition to exporter i and importer j countries, we need to 
take another two countries, one as reference exporter l and another as reference importer k. So by 
taking a “tetrad” of equation (1) with ij, ik, lj, and lk sets and denoting it as ℶ, it can be 
represented as 
 ℶ(𝑖𝑙)(𝑗𝑘) =
𝑥𝑖𝑗 𝑥𝑖𝑘⁄
𝑥𝑙𝑗 𝑥𝑙𝑘⁄
, (6) 
which then through elimination of monadic (
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
𝑦𝑤(𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗)
1−𝜎) and fixed dyadic terms (𝑡?̅?𝑗) can be 
reduced to “tetrad” of 𝜑s: 
 ℶ(𝑖𝑙)(𝑗𝑘) =
𝜑𝑖𝑗 𝜑𝑖𝑘⁄
𝜑𝑙𝑗 𝜑𝑙𝑘⁄
= 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃ , 
(7) 
where 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃ = (𝑡𝑖𝑗)
1−𝜎 is an overall measure of observable and unobservable trade-cost factors. 
Although 𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃ s contain elasticity of substitution (𝜎), no assumption about the level of elasticity 
needs to be imposed which is crucially important since exogenously introduced level of elasticity 
is always questionable.  
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Unlike traditional fixed effect methods, the tetrad approach allows for time-varying 
changes in relative trade costs across different country pairs. For example, Head et al. (2010) 
analyse the time varying effect of independence on trade between a metropolis (colonizer), 
colony, and siblings (other colonies), to capture the effect of other relevant bilateral factors 
(changes in RTA, GATT membership, and currency rates). Romalis (2007) used the approach to 
evaluate the effect of NAFTA tariffs on trade flows among USA, Mexico, and Canada. Our 
purpose is to decompose the GMT into two parts: 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗 = 𝐷𝑖𝑗𝑀𝑖,𝑗, (8) 
where the dyad, 𝐷𝑖𝑗, stand for varying overall trade measure powered by trade elasticity, 1 − 𝜎. 
The dyad represents the country-pair-specific (ij) networking or trade cost component of trade: 
 𝐷𝑖𝑗 = 𝜑𝑖𝑗. (9) 
The monad, 𝑀𝑖,𝑗, is the combination of the country specific components for each country in the 
pair ij: economic size and MRT. This is derived by eliminating 𝐷𝑖𝑗 from equation (1): 
 𝑀𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑦𝑖𝑦𝑗
∑ 𝑦𝑗𝑗 (𝑃𝑖𝑃𝑗)
1−𝜎. 
(10) 
 
3.3 Data 
Our bilateral trade panel contains 37 countries over the period 1995-2011.
8
 The selection of 
countries was based on volume of trade with the CACs region. Sadly, data on 1989-1992 period 
are either missing or if reported are unreliable; these problems also apply to the data for the 
period till 1994 which is characterized by hyperinflation. Consequently, our study starts from 
1995. 
Bilateral trade flows and tariff rates for the 1995-2011 period, in 2007 US dollars were 
obtained from WITS (www.wits.org). This contains both the COMTRADE and TRAINS 
bilateral databases, both of which contain some of the necessary data, as COMTRADE covers 
only WTO members, while TRAINS covers all the CACs, but aggregates the EU into one single 
region. The other issue was that one third of all trade data for some countries was missing or 
                                                          
8
 The 37 countries considered are Algeria, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, China, Croatia, Finland, France, Georgia, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, and Uzbekistan.  
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unreported; consequently we had to use interpolation which allowed reduction of missing trade 
data from 1/3 to 1/5.  
GDP levels were obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics database 
(www.imf.org ), while geographic distances between capital cities of the countries and standard 
gravity dummies for colonization, common language, and common border were obtained from 
CEPII (www.cepii.fr). Additional binomial dummies for landlockedness and RTA membership 
were also included. Summary statistics, description of variables and correlation matrixes are 
reported in Table 2 and Table 3 respectively. 
- Tables 2 and 3 here – 
 
3.4 The estimation model 
We estimate a set of log-linear models. First, we consider a standard OLS model with fixed 
effect dummies: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎2𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎3𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎4𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑎5𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑎6𝐼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡, (11) 
where 𝑎0 is constant, 𝑦𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦𝑗𝑡 are proxied with nominal GDP levels of exporter 𝑖 and importer 
𝑗 country respectively, 𝑎3 = 1 − 𝜎 is trade elasticity, 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is error term; 𝐼𝑖𝑡 is exporter-year, 𝐼𝑗𝑡 is 
importer-year, and 𝐼𝑡 represents year binary dummies to proxy 𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑃𝑗𝑡, and 𝑦𝑤, respectively, for 
theoretical consistency. Our trade costs take the following form: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏1ln𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏2 ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝑏3𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏4𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏5𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 +
𝑏6𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝑏7𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏8𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑏9𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
(12) 
In equation (12), the geographic distance  (dist) proxy for transport cost, trf 
9
 stands for border 
cost, and further binomial dummies capture effects of historic (common language and colony), 
geographic (sharing borders, one and both landlocked), and economic linkages (one and both in 
RTA) effects on trade cost; u is error term. In the equation time constant variables, unlike time 
variant ones, have no time subscript.   
As previously mentioned, the derived values from tetrading - the dyads - stand for time-
varying bilateral factors, which can be expressed as: 
 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝑑0 + 𝑑1𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑2𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡 +  𝑑3𝑙𝑛𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃ + 𝑑4𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝑑5𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝑑6𝐼𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑡, 
 
(13) 
                                                          
9
 Taking log of 1+trf is necessary to account for the cases with zero tariffs in our data. 
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where  
 𝑙𝑛𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃ = 𝑐0 + 𝑐1𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐2 ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) + 𝑐3𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐4𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐5𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 +
𝑐6𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 + 𝑐7𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 + 𝑐8𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐9𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡. 
(14) 
Feenstra (2004) states that fixed effects models are the most reliable and simple method 
to estimate gravity of trade flows. The fixed effect dummies proxy the omitted MRT terms effect. 
If the interest is as in our case to estimate coefficients of time-invariant variables (such as 
distance) then Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS) method which works the same way as 
fixed effects model is appropriate to use.
10
 
Potentially, DVLS estimates could suffer from serial correlation, non-stationarity and 
endogeneity. Moreover, DVLS does not take into account zero trade values where it is unknown 
whether these are true zeroes or unreported values. In any case zero trade values should not be 
neglected, especially when 1/5 of our observations are zeroes. Experts suggest re-estimating the 
GMT using other estimators that handle these issues such as TSLS (Two Stage Least Squares) to 
control for endogeneity bias (Egger et al., 2011), DVLS (with AR option) - for autocorrelation 
issue (Martin and Pham, 2009), PPML (Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood) estimator - for 
inclusion of zero trade values, and FDE (First Differencing) estimator - for stationarity of 
variables as discussed by Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010). Following the relevant literature we 
run tests for non-stationarity and co-integration and report the results in Table 4 which shows 
that some variables (GDPs and RTAs) are non-stationary in levels but stationary in first 
differences. Furthermore, there seems to be no issues with cointegration of variables. 
- Table 4 here - 
 
4 Estimation results 
4.1 Gravity model results 
Results are presented in Table 5, where control variables are categorized into country-specific 
factors (importer and exporter GDP), time-invariant bilateral (networking) factors (distance, 
landlockedness, shared common borders, common language, and common historical colonizer), 
and time-variant bilateral factors (tariff rates, participation in RTA). The estimates in columns 1 
to 5 are obtained using (1) Dummy Variable Least Squares (DVLS) with the STATA’s robust 
                                                          
10
 The fixed effect estimator drops all the variables that are constant over time like distances, therefore, including 
fixed effect dummies produces the same results as the fixed effect estimator but also estimates coefficients for 
constant variables. 
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and cluster option, (2) DVLS with AR option, (3) Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS), (4) Poisson 
Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator, and (5) First Differencing (FDE) estimator 
respectively.   
- Table 5 here - 
Regarding signs, estimated coefficients across different estimators show a logical 
relationship between the explained variable and explanatory variables and agree with correlation 
matrix results (Table 3); trade is positively associated with both exporter and importer GDPs as 
well as with the dummies for a common language, and with the countries being members of the 
same RTA, while in contrast, distance, landlockedness, and tariff rates are negatively correlated 
with trade. However, we observe some sign disagreements of coefficients (depending on 
estimator in use) such as unexpected signs of tariff and colony variables in PPML column. 
Common border is found in many gravity papers to have positive correlation to trade, but only 
TSLS column confirms it in the CACs case. 
Regarding magnitudes, estimated coefficients across all estimators are similar which 
enables us to confirm a range of predictions. DVLS and DVLS (AR) coefficients are more 
similar compared to TSLS or PPML ones, indicating that serial correlation is not a severe issue 
(as expected for short time-series panel). Controlling for endogeneity changes some coefficients 
slightly (GDPs, distance, and border), but inclusion of zero trade values produces even more 
change in coefficients for most variables. This is notable from the number of observations in the 
DVLS and TSLS cases (19,522) and in the PPML case (23,273). Inclusion of more observations 
indeed gives more precise estimates, and in fact we observe quite a significant change in 
coefficient values. Despite the improvements in estimates due to inclusion of zero trades it is 
hard to rely on PPML as its goodness of fit is only 59% and lower than the other estimators’ fit 
of 81-82%. FDE compared with DVLS provides coefficients almost twice smaller – a regularity, 
which has been pointed out in Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010).  
Based on equations (13)-(14) gravity variables are re-estimated and reported in Table 6. 
Comparing the country specific coefficients in Table 6 (part a) and Table 5 confirm that importer 
GDP is more important than the exporter’s, however, DVLS (AR) provides more similar values 
that are in line with GDP coefficients presented in Table 5. In Table 6 (part b) dependent variable 
is a product of a tetrad which is regressed over gravity trade cost variables. Coefficient signs and 
magnitudes are quite similar to ones in Table 5 while coefficients for some variables such as 
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landlockedness are significant and quite high, at least for estimates from DVLS, DVLS (AR) and 
PPML, while TSLS values fall well in line with gravity estimates. Estimated coefficients by both 
the gravity and tetrad models can be grouped into two categories according to their economic 
and statistical significance. 
- Table 6 here - 
Variables which are both statistically and economically significant: tariffs, distance and 
landlockedness 
A 10% increase in distance leads to a 16-22% decrease in trade. Similar results are obtained by 
Suvankulov and Guc (2012). Usually gravity studies estimate distance coefficient equal to one 
but the geographic distance is indeed important factor when we talk about CACs trade. The huge 
distance of CACs from the major trade centres creates a big obstacle for their goods to be 
competitive in world markets. The effect is exacerbated further by the fact that CACs are 
landlocked having no direct access to sea corridors. A 13-35% or 10-51% trade drops when one 
(exporter or importer) or both traders are landlocked respectively. Except for the PPML results in 
Table 5, we find that tariffs are statistically and economically significant as an increase in tariff 
rate by 1% causes about 1.9-3.8% reduction in trade. 
Variables which are only statistically (but not economically) significant: RTA membership, 
GDP levels and common border 
To reduce trading costs CACs join RTAs which is beneficial only to those who are in the same 
RTA. A pair of countries joining a RTA leads to 5-16% trade increase, while if only one country 
is a RTA member trade drops by 0.6-17%. A 10% increase of exporter’s GDP increase trade by 
0.6-4.8%, while 10% importer’s GDP increase leads to 3.9-7.8% increase in trade meaning that 
importer’s GDP is twice as important in the case of CACs. This finding makes sense when we 
consider the fact that overland transportation costs in trade with CACs are very high and these 
are passed to importers (AvW, 2004). In contrast to other gravity studies, a common border 
negatively affects trade - trade drops by 0.3-1%. This might be explained by the fact that we 
considering trade of landlocked countries which have to pay extra costs associated with crossing 
territories of neighbouring (landlocked) countries in order to export or import goods. 
 
4.2 Gravity decomposition results 
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There are 185 (5 CACs by 37 partners) country pair trade relations decomposed into monadic 
(country-specific) and dyadic (networking) components. By plotting these over the period 1995-
2011, we can observe changes in the trade flows and bilateral relations over time. For simplicity 
trade and dyads obtained only by DVLS estimator and using France and Germany as reference 
importer and export respectively are reported. We find that in 17 years of independence each 
CAC improved its trade with all countries in the pool (37 countries including intra-trade) and 
country-specific and networking factors increased their influence. The changes vary from 
country pair to country pair though, but it is still feasible to categorize results into two groups as 
follows. 
Monadic-driven bilateral trade 
In this group of country pairs, a gap appears between trade flow and bilateral trade component 
(dyad) which becomes wider over time. This happens because the slope of growing trade flows is 
greater than that of the dyadic component. 136 country-pair relationships (or about 75% of all 
bilateral trade) fall into this category. The example of country-pair trade dominated by monadic 
factors is shown in Figure 2 (plot 1). 
- Figure 2 here - 
Dyadic-driven bilateral trade 
In this group of country pairs trade is increasing at the same rate as dyadic costs do while 
monadic component is constant over time. 49 (or about 25%) country-pair relationships fall into 
this category. The example of dyadic driven country-pair trade is shown in Figure 2 (plot 2). 
The aggregate dyadic and monadic component shares in bilateral trade of each CAC are 
reported in Table 7 and show remarkable heterogeneity in trade behaviour. Detailed information 
on all 185 country pairs is reported in Mazhikeyev et al. (2014). Comparing our estimates of 
dyads (networking effects) with results from the alternative method offered in Novy (2013), 
which assumes trade elasticity equal to 8, produced similar dynamic changes in dyads and 
overall trade costs over time. This similarity confirms that tetrading can be successfully 
employed for decomposition analysis in the case of CACs. 
- Table 7 here - 
 
5 Discussion and conclusions 
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Our study confirms the four hypotheses set out in section 2. First of all, while all CACs have 
experienced growing trade since the end of the 1998 Russian crisis, this does not mean that the 
countries are homogeneous. In fact, while they share aspects of culture, history and 
landlockedness, the CACs show considerable variety in initial conditions (size, population, 
resource base, specialisation). Moreover, in terms of transitional reforms, there is a considerable 
divergence between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, in the reformist camp, and the other CACs. 
Reform in terms of trade tends to be strongly correlated with other transitional reforms such as 
privatisation and enterprise restructuring linking at theoretical level to the liability of localness 
concept that we tried to utilise in explaining the micro (firm) level drives of trade performance.  
Secondly, we note that trade has grown considerably in all countries, reflecting the rise in 
Russian and regional incomes (following stabilisation and oil/gas price recovery). Oil and gas 
exporters have particularly benefited. However, the evidence is that the more isolationist states 
have simply relied on these, possibly fortuitous factors to boost their trade, whereas the more 
reform-minded states have achieved considerable trade growth through reducing trade costs. 
Hence, the growth and fluctuations in trade of the “more isolationist” economies Turkmenistan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan are driven by changes over time in monadic variables (primarily GDP) 
while trade partnerships of “more open” economies Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are driven 
roughly equally by dyadic variables (changes in trade costs) as well as monadic variables.  
We re-emphasise that our findings summarised above are subject to some data limitations 
and caveats associated with the estimation methods used. Next we discuss implications of our 
results for business strategy and government policy. 
Globalization vs. regionalization 
In the era of globalization, countries build more trade connections that raise income and welfare. 
However, there are also some negative implications: not just in terms of trade diversion where 
integration is regional, but also in terms of vulnerability to shocks. For example, during the 1998 
Russian crisis The Euromoney Risk Ranking for Russia went up from 78 (in December 1997) to 
129 (in September 1998). Observing this situation, Fitch IBCA lowered Russian International 
Credit Rating from B+ to CCC-. As a result, Russian interest rates increased from 3% to 6%. 
This had a strong impact upon the CACs, both through monadic effects (GDP in a major export 
market reduced), and through trade costs (since access to finance is important for trade).  
Kazakhstan, with a common border with Russia, was more exposed than Tajikistan and 
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Kyrgyzstan, and was hit by the crisis harder (Westin, 1999), although even the isolationist CACs 
were dependent on Russia as the primary export market for their gas, as dictated by pipeline 
routes. Financial shortages reduced CACs-Russia trade in both directions by 40%. Furthermore, 
the debt-to-GDP ratio, in early 1999, rose more sharply for small open CACs, Kyrgyzstan (54%) 
and Tajikistan (90%), and less for large and more diversified Kazakhstan (17%) while for 
isolationist Turkmenistan (1.7%) and Uzbekistan (- 4.4%) the effect was negligible (Pastor and 
Damjanovic, 2001). 
In support of Hypothesis 4 the current fall in the global price of oil, and the effects of 
Western sanctions on Russia will have heterogeneous effects on these countries. Paradoxically, 
the countries which have reformed trade more, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, are more tied in the 
short-medium term to fluctuations in the Russian economy, and their currencies are already 
showing evidence of spillover of the current Russian crisis.  
Transport links and RTAs  
The CACs’ location in the heart of Eurasia is strategically important but imposes a disadvantage 
in trade. Overland transport costs of goods average $1380/1000km, almost 10 times higher than 
by sea ($190/1000km) raising trade costs by 60% as found by Limao and Venables (2001). 
According to the Vinokurov (2009) CACs main trade flows go in three main directions: (i) to 
Russia and Europe via the Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent/Bishkek – Dushanbe – Almaty - 
Moscow/Kiev) or TRACECA (Bishkek – Tashkent – Almaty – Aktau – Baku – Batumi); (ii) to 
Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia via the Central-Railway (Almaty/Bishkek – Tashkent – 
Ashkhabat – Turkmenbashi – Tehran – Istanbul); (iii) to China and Asian-Pacific Region via the 
East-Trans-Asian-Railway (Tashkent - Bishkek/Dushanbe – Dostyk – Lianyungang). Leamer 
and Levinsohn (1994) rightly assert that “distance matters and it matters a lot”; since 90% of 
CACs trade is by rail the assertion is particularly relevant for the CACs case.  
Raballand (2003) found that the trade of landlocked Former Soviet Union countries fell 
by 80% compared to coastal ones during 1995-1999. Landlocked CACs had to negotiate with 
bordering coastal states, as well as other landlocked states controlling routes (Grigoriou, 2007). 
For example, Uzbekistan is virtually surrounded by other landlocked countries. Trade barriers 
imposed by (coastal) Russia to landlocked CACs were very high (Djarkov and Freud, 2002). 
Even though Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan share a border with coastal China, trade is 
impeded by the Himalaya-Tibet massif, and the only convenient geographic corridor to China is 
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the Djunghar Gate of Kazakhstan. Note that the infrastructure and rail roads to China were built 
during the Soviet era mostly with strategic considerations (Grigoriou, 2007), and partly reflect 
poor Soviet-Chinese relations since the late 1950s. Furthermore, Pittman (2013) finds that 
reforms to the monopolistic freight railways in the Former Soviet Union have slowed to a halt 
over time, and that even the more reform-minded countries (the Baltics, Russia and Kazakhstan) 
have not followed the path of Western railway modernisation. 
While our study finds RTA membership to be only weakly economically significant, 
RTAs potentially allow CACs to lessen transport and transit costs as well as to improve regional 
transport infrastructure and create transport corridors. However, the complexity of regional trade 
partnerships often creates additional obstacles. Moreover, most of the regional RTAs have had 
relatively little practical importance (Acharya et al., 2011). The major exception is the Eurasian 
Custom Union (EACU) which unifies the external tariffs of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. 
Magilevskii (2012) demonstrates the EACU effect by pointing out that the trade turnover 
between Kazakhstan and Russia increased by 28% between 2010-11, while for the same period 
growth rate of trade between the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Russian 
Federation and the other CACs is 19%. Kyrgyzstan is likely to join the EACU next year and 
Tajikistan is currently negotiating its membership. However, Kassenova (2012) reports that 
despite the EACU formation, Kazakhstan still faces high Russian NTBs. Furthermore, there are 
serious questions outstanding, especially for those CACs reluctant to reform, like Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan, who are not showing any sign of interest in the EACU. 
Other important factors of trade 
Other factors of importance are the conditions of access and use of CACs’ transport 
infrastructure (Grigoriou, 2007), CACs access to sea ports (Kulipanova, 2012), transit systems in 
the region (Raballand, 2003). Trade barriers, indeed, are reaching beyond the transport and 
border costs, and as mentioned in AvW (2004) also include policy costs (tariff and non-tariff like 
quotas), cost of information and currency exchange, finance, distribution costs and trade costs 
associated with unobservable barriers linked to cultural and historic ties. Indeed, trade costs as 
estimated in our gravity formulation will include any costs of business regulation and corruption. 
Evans (1999) suggest that political systems, differences in education, production, market and 
industrial structure should be considered as primary factors of trade. Dow and Karunaratna (2006) 
examine 37 different studies to identify main ‘psychic’ distance factors. They find that culture, 
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language, education level, religion, time zone, industrial development, and political systems are 
most common factors used in trade studies. Of these factors, the latter two are likely to be most 
relevant for the CACs. Inherited from Soviet days the main industries and infrastructure in CACs 
are quite outdated, but the energy rich CACs (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) using 
oil and gas revenues have been able to modernize their industries, while Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan developed their agrarian sectors. Regarding the political system, the IMF (2012) 
finds that relatively liberal (more accurately less authoritarian) political systems (like in 
Kyrgyzstan, compared to Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) are linked to less restrictive trade 
regimes.  
To conclude: we find a relationship between being an open/isolationist country and having 
dyadic/monadic driven trade with other countries. Open CACs’ (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) 
trade performance is mostly explained by time varying bilateral factors while the trade 
performance of isolationist CACs (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) is affected mostly 
by country-specific properties. The IB literature on liability of localness versus foreignness has 
particular relevance to CACs, because of their past Soviet ties. Under the Soviet system, trade 
and other economic reforms which would place local enterprises at a liability, were avoided. The 
price was greatly reduced incentive to innovate or to develop products saleable on world markets. 
Our hypotheses and gravity evidence show that those CACs which are now reforming are 
achieving an increasing ability to export to markets more widely than simply the former Soviet 
countries, even though Russia remains the primary trade partner in many cases. A possible 
implication is that, at least in industries where Russian businesses themselves have reformed, the 
process of integration into an Eurasian bloc may not necessarily be damaging to export 
performance with the rest of the world. However, some countries may fear loss of sovereignty 
(Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2013) or look for alternative alliances to the East or the South. Clearly, 
the ongoing CACs integration processes and their international business implications present an 
interesting case for future research.  
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Figure 1 A game tree of openness and trade: actors and interactions 
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Figure 2 Illustrative examples of Monadic-driven and Dyadic-driven trade  
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Table 1 CACs exports, imports and internal trade 
 
1995-99 2000-03 2004-07 2008-11 
Total Exports (in bln U.S. dollars) 
Kazakhstan 21.9 29.0 64.0 103.4 
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.5 2.2 2.6 
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.7 2.2 
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.9 14.1 18.9 
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.9 11.9 19.8 
 
Total Imports (in bln U.S. dollars) 
Kazakhstan 22.3 28.4 66.6 93.4 
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.4 2.5 2.6 
Tajikistan 0.9 0.8 1.9 2.4 
Turkmenistan 4.5 5.6 14.4 28.1 
Uzbekistan 5.7 4.7 13.7 22.0 
 
Total Internal trade (in bln U.S. dollars) 
Kazakhstan 20.2 23.4 73.7 135.5 
Kyrgyzstan 1.6 1.5 3.1 5.1 
Tajikistan 1.0 1.2 3.0 5.8 
Turkmenistan 3.6 7.7 20.0 32.2 
Uzbekistan 14.2 11.1 18.3 38.8 
 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database (2013) 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the variables (n=23274) 
Variable Description Min Max Mean s.d. 
𝑦𝑟 Year 1995 2011 2003 4.899 
𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 Exports, in billions of US dollars 0 1038090 971.21 14862.54 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 GDP of exporter, in billions of US 
dollars 
0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5 
𝑦𝑗𝑡 GDP of importer, in billions of US 
dollars 
0.569 28062 972.01 2345.5 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 Geographic distance, in km 69.04 11763.9 3512.8 2578.6 
𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡 Effectively applied tariffs, in 
percentages 
0 121.04 3.4594 5.6896 
𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 Dummy for common border 
between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.078 0.2695 
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 Dummy for common language 
between I and j is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0394 0.1946 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 Dummy for common colonial 
history between I and j is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0321 0.1763 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 Dummy for landlocked I is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.4558 0.4980 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 Dummy for both landlocked I and j 
is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.1234 0.3289 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 Dummy for RTA membership of I 
only is 1, otherwise 0 
0 1 0.3389 0.4733 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 Dummy for both, I and j, are 
members of the same RTA is 1, 
otherwise 0 
0 1 0.0467 0.2111 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑖 Radius of I from (0,0) geographic 
coordinate 
3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370 
𝑅𝑎𝑑𝑗 Radius of j from (0,0) geographic 
coordinate 
3.6427 17.33361 10.268 3.8370 
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Table 3 Correlation matrix (n=19522) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 1.0            
2 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 0.5730 1           
3 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡 0.4894 0.0403 1          
4 ln𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 -0.2440 0.1238 0.1976 1         
5 ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) -0.2336 0.0065 -0.0756 0.3634 1        
6 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 0.1384 -0.0216 -0.0321 -0.3260 -0.0424 1       
7 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 0.1033 0.0371 0.0171 -0.0467 0.0185 0.2751 1      
8 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 0.1316 0.0430 0.0462 -0.0728 0.0080 0.2487 0.2890 1     
9 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 -0.3106 -0.1963 -0.1413 0.0387 0.0270 -0.0132 -0.0204 -0.0124 1    
10 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 -0.1508 -0.2738 -0.2843 -0.1872 -0.1147 0.0979 0.0544 -0.0683 -0.3117 1   
11 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 -0.3697 -0.2484 -0.2212 0.1035 0.1569 0.0276 -0.1166 -0.0399 0.3831 0.1292 1  
12 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 -0.0264 -0.1897 -0.2136 -0.1406 -0.0587 0.1613 0.1734 0.2310 -0.0861 0.4211 -0.1427 1 
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Table 4 Non-stationarity and cointegration test results 
 (a) Phillips-Perron non-stationarity test 
  Statistic p-value Statistic p-value 
 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2610)  6495.4 0 2.18e+04 0 
Z Inverse normal  -17.1 0 -95.4 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6234) -29.1 0 -162.7 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared 53.4 0 265.2 0 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  1439.1 1 5220.6 0 
Z Inverse normal  21.3 1 -25.3 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 -26.9 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -17.5 1 33.5 0 
 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡 Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  1439.1 1 5220.6 0 
Z Inverse normal  21.3 1 -25.3 0 
L* Inverse logit t(6664) 19.2 1 -26.9 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -17.5 1 33.5 0 
 ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  6777.9 0 2.72e+04 0 
Z Inverse normal  -25.1 0 -127.4 0 
L* Inverse logit t(5994) -37.1 0 -215.5 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared 54.6 0 330.7 0 
 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  283.7 1 3795.4 0 
Z Inverse normal  11.8 1 -46.9 0 
L* Inverse logit t(2039) 10.7 1 -51.7 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -33.1 1 14.2 0 
 𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 Level Difference 
P Inverse chi-squared (2738)  209.4 1 3631.5 0 
Z Inverse normal  13.7 1 -46.7 0 
L* Inverse logit t(1834) 12.4 1 -52.2 0 
Pm Modified inverse chi-squared -34.1 1 12.1 0 
(b) Westerlund ECM cointegration test 
 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡/𝑦𝑖𝑡/ 𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡/𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡/𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 Statistic Z-value P-value 
Gt  -1.155 50.005 1 
Ga  2.997 77.040 1 
Pa  11.493 101.502 1 
Note: in (a) null hypothesis is variable is non-stationary, and in (b) null hypothesis is no cointegration 
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Table 5 Gravity regression estimates 
 
Estimation Method DVLS  DVLS(AR) PPML TSLS FDE  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Country specific terms 
Constant 10.49*** 12.48*** 20.23*** 5.87*** 0.16*** 
  (1.205) (0.84) (1.135) (0.421) (0.036) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡  0.78*** 0.69*** 0.55*** 0.62*** 0.39* 
  (0.046) (0.028) (0.043) (0.012) (0.17) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 0.14*** 0.07*** 0.41*** 0.26*** 0.07** 
  (0.038) (0.013) (0.04) (0.009) (0.025) 
Time invariant bilateral terms 
𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 -1.67*** -1.68*** -2.19*** -1.04*** 
   (0.092) (0.05) (0.1) (0.053) 
 𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 -0.29*** -0.33* -1.16*** 0.44* 
   (0.160) (0.143) (0.189) (0.2) 
 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 0.40 0.43* 0.64 0.54 
   (0.213) (0.187) (0.334) (0.314) 
 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 0.48 0.49* -0.63* 0.63 
   (0.286) (0.212) (0.252) (0.767) 
 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 -1.25** -1.88*** -3.72*** -1.5*** 
   (0.446) (0.347) (0.371) (0.108) 
 𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 -1.02 -2.24** -5.24*** -1.55*** 
   (1.874) (0.691) (0.703) (0.756) 
 Time variant bilateral terms 
ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) -3.65*** -2.55*** 0.44 -3.83*** -1.99*** 
  (0.518) (0.163) (2.284) (0.175) (0.372) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 -0.01 -0.02 -1.12*** 0.03 -0.04 
  (0.046) (0.024) (0.32) (0.03) (0.025) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.41*** 0.35*** 1.64*** 0.42*** 0.20*** 
  (0.047) (0.026) (0.189) (0.024) (0.027) 
Observations 19,522 19,522 23,273 19,522 18,079 
Adj. R-squared 0.82 0.82 0.59 0.64 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 6 Tetrad regression estimates 
 
Estimation Method DVLS DVLS(AR) PPML TSLS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(a) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑡 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑗𝑡 0.32*** 0.67*** 
 
0.04*** 
  (0.013) (0.019) 
 
(0.004) 
𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑡 0.23*** 0.07*** 
 
0.03*** 
  (0.012) (0.008) 
 
(0.002) 
𝑙𝑛𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃  0.98***  
 
0.95*** 
  (0.002)  
 
(0.007) 
(b) Dependent variable: 𝑙𝑛𝜑𝑖𝑗𝑡̃    
𝑙𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 -1.65*** -1.66*** -2.06*** -0.68*** 
  (0.09) (0.051) (0.104) (0.081) 
𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑗 -0.27 -0.30* -1.13*** 0.8** 
  (0.161) (0.145) (0.183) (0.285) 
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 0.39 0.43* 0.6 0.92* 
  (0.213) (0.19) (0.33) (0.372) 
𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑗 0.49 0.52* 0.57* 0.95* 
  (0.286) (0.216) (0.243) (0.408) 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖 -6.36*** -6.39*** -6.88*** -2.51*** 
  (0.322) (0.298) (0.241) (0.145) 
𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑖𝑗 -11.27*** -11.29*** -11.72*** -3.49*** 
  (0.613) (0.592) (0.446) (0.227) 
ln(1 + 𝑡𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑗𝑡) -4.28*** -2.94*** -3.32 -7.39*** 
  (0.532) (0.174) (2.359) (0.215) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 -0.01 -0.02 -0.95*** 0.14*** 
  (0.048) (0.025) (0.168) (0.025) 
𝑅𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗𝑡 0.47*** 0.38*** 1.62*** 0.86*** 
  (0.05) (0.027) (0.149) (0.026) 
Constant 8.21*** 8.37*** 13.04*** -7.01*** 
  (0.972) (0.712) (0.956) (0.659) 
Observations 16.426 16.426 19,166 16,426 
Adj. R-squared 0.82 0.81 
 
0.31 
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 7 Summary of Dyadic and Monadic driven trade 
Country pair trade of Dyadic driven Monadic driven 
Kazakhstan 58% 42% 
Kyrgyzstan 50% 50% 
Tajikistan 8% 92% 
Turkmenistan 4% 96% 
Uzbekistan 4% 96% 
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Appendix, Box 1 Main Central Asia RTAs (in chronological order) 
• 1991 - Central Asian Commonwealth (CAC) with five members (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) was established; the organization merged with the 
EurAsEC in 2006. 
• 1994 - Commonwealth of Independent States Free Trade Agreement (CISFTA) was created 
covering all the CIS countries, although by 2009, only eight of its members (Kazakhstan, 
Russia, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Moldova, and Ukraine) remained, with the 
other CIS countries (Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) becoming observers.  
• 1996 - Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) was established by Kazakhstan, Russia 
and Belarus. In 2001, these three countries as well as Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan signed a 
treaty to organize a common system of water and energy use. Uzbekistan withdrew from the 
organisation. 
• 1996 - Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed among China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and further in 2001 Uzbekistan joined the group as well. 
• 1998 - Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan joined the WTO (as did Russia in 2012). 
• 2010 - Eurasian Customs Union (EACU) was established between Kazakhstan, Russia and 
Belarus, which is intended to be the first step towards forming “Common Economic Space”, a 
common supranational system of trade and tariffs connecting all CIS countries.  
 
